Interbeing

Near-synonyms: oneness, unity

Turn now to the second argument against momentary welfarism for OHPs: the argument from the temporal scope of fair distribution, grounded in the "separateness of persons." The very term, "separateness of persons," suggests that this criterion is thought applicable to the ethics of interpersonal distribution only because the beings involved are persons. Imagine beings that persist over time but are merely sentient. We could determine the lifetime well-being of such beings (as the sum of momentary well-being arising from pains and pleasures). Lifetime prioritarianism applied to a population of such creatures would respect their separateness; it would distinguish between an inter-being transfer of momentary well-being, and an intra-being transfer of the same amount from one moment in a being's life to another. But is there a persuasive case that the ethics of merely sentient beings should make this distinction?